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I. Introduction
When countries crash, a natural thing for their inhabitants to do, inter alia, is inspect their legal and constitutional foundation to look for latent flaws and to fix them. This was, in fact, one of the demands of the 'Pots-and-pans revolution' that shook Iceland after the country's spectacular financial crash in October 2008 when three banks comprising 85 percent of the country's banking system collapsed within a week and the domestic equity market was virtually wiped out overnight. The rest of the banking system crashed in quick succession.
The 'Pots-and-pans revolution' owes its name to the boisterous banging of kitchen utensils that helped seal the fate of the government, forcing it to resign in early 2009 and to declare a new parliamentary election that the leading party of the pre-crash government -a grand coalition of the two largest political parties, the Independence Party and the Social Democratic Alliance -lost decisively, paving the way for the formation of a new government of the Social Democratic Alliance and the Left-Green Movement. These events went hand in hand with an initially unenthusiastic public investigation into what went wrong. A special prosecutor's office was set up and the position of special prosecutor was advertized, but there were no takers. After some delays, the minister of justice appointed a special prosecutor to whom the Financial Supervisory Authority, under new post-crash management, had by early 2012 referred about 80 cases of suspected fraud before and surrounding the crash. Meanwhile, parliament appointed a Special Investigation Committee (SIC) which delivered a devastating report in April 2010, exposing criminal wrongdoing by the banks and serious negligence by several politicians and public officials (see Gylfason, 2010) . In response to the SIC report, parliament passed, in September 2010, a unanimous resolution, with 63 votes against zero, stating, among other things, that "Parliament resolves that criticism of Iceland's political culture must be taken seriously, and emphasizes that lessons must be learned from it.
Parliament resolves that the SIC report is a damning verdict of the government, of politicians, and of public administration ..." (my translation).
When airplanes crash we do not turn the page. No, we insist on a full-scale investigation.
The same must apply when banks crash, especially when they all crash at the same time. We owe it to ourselves as well as to others, including those who were hurt and also those who bailed us out. The National Transport Safety Board investigates every civil-aviation crash in the United States. In Europe, national Civil Aviation Accidents Commissions perform this vital role. Their principal concern is public safety as well as respect for the truth. In this regard, there is a case for viewing banking and finance the same way as civil aviation. This is why, when things go wrong, there needs to be a trustworthy mechanism in place to secure full disclosure. If national governments hesitate, the international community may want to consider mutually acceptable ways to fill the gap. Credible crash analysis is indispensable lest history repeat itself.
After the collapse of communism in 1989-91, the countries of East and Central Europe, all except Hungary which waited until 2012, adopted about 25 new constitutions (Elster, 1995) .
South Africa adopted a new constitution 1994-96 following the defeat of apartheid. After the recent regime changes in North Africa, several countries of the region are now about to revise their constitutions. Most constitutions are written or revised following economic or political upheaval of some kind because crises often trigger demands for a fresh start or expose flaws that need to be fixed. In quiet times, people and politicians most often feel they have other things to think about. There are exceptions, however, such as the constitutions of Sweden (1974) and Canada (1982) that were rewritten out of the blue without being triggered by crises. Elster (1995) identifies seven waves of constitution making following the Declaration of Independence of the United States in 1776. First, during 1780-91 the United States, Poland, and France adopted new constitutions, as did Sweden in 1809 and Norway in 1814. Second, following revolutions in Europe in 1848 several countries adopted new constitutions some of which did not last long, however, because the revolutions producing them were suppressed.
II. From seven waves to economics
The third wave swept Europe after World War I (1914-18) when Poland, Czechoslovakia, and defeated Germany passed new constitutions. The fourth wave followed World War II when Italy, Germany, and Japan had new constitutions more or less dictated to them by the victors. The fifth wave rose around the same time as the sun set on the colonial empires of the United Kingdom, France, and others in Asia and Africa after 1945. Those constitutions were most often derived from those of the former colonial powers. The sixth wave went up when authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe were driven from power in 1974-78 and Greece, Portugal, and Spain adopted new democratic constitutions. The seventh and last wave swept East and Central Europe after the collapse of communism around 1990. In recent years, several Latin American nations have revised their constitutions, introducing novel provisions on environmental protection, among other things. Ackerman (1997) covers a similar ground, referring to the past sixty years as a "wave of constitutionalism."
On the whole, the connection between constitution making and crises or other types of emergencies seems fairly clear. Elster (1995) distinguishes several types of crises or emergencies and how they gave rise to new constitutions. The upheaval caused by the revolutionary war in the United States 1775-83 gave rise to the making of a new constitution in 1787. The French constitution of 1791 and the revolution of 1789 sprang from a common cause, namely, grotesque disparities of wealth that showed, among other things, in an average height difference between the aristocracy and the working class of two to three inches (Komlos, 2003) . Likewise, the constitutions of France and Germany in 1848 can be traced to the revolutionary situation in Europe at the time. Iceland's constituent assembly of 1851 sprang from the same source, but failed to achieve constitutional reform even if it did succeed in engineering the abolition of the last vestiges of the Danish King's trade monopoly in Iceland. The French constitution of 1958, again according to Elster (1995) In retrospect, one may wonder whether, in the United States, the Glass-Steagall Act separating commercial banking from investment banking activities to increase the safety of depositors and to reduce the likelihood and scope of future financial crises should, perhaps in conjunction with the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934, have taken the form of a constitutional amendment. The aim of Glass-Steagall was to protect ordinary bank customers from exposure to unnecessary and unwanted risk (Gylfason et al., 2010, Ch. 4) . Had this protection been inserted into the constitution, the deliberate, some would say reckless, deregulation of banking and finance in the United States after 1980 would have been more difficult to bring about. Perhaps, the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the ensuing international financial crisis could then have been averted.
Admittedly, this trail of thought is complicated by the fact that, north of the border, only a few small banks failed in the 1930s. Canada's financial system has remained strong, even during the current global crisis. Yet, unlike US banks under Glass-Steagall, Canadian banks have always been universal, offering commercial banking services and investment banking services side by side without incident. For this reason, the separation of commercial banking and investment banking along the lines of Glass-Steagall has not been thought necessary in Canada, and not in Europe either. In view of Europe's recent banking problems, however, perhaps Europe needed Glass-Steagall all along. But Canada is clean. The erection of legal firewalls to separate commercial banking from investment banking cannot, therefore, be viewed as a necessary universal remedy against recurrent financial crises. Even so, the fact that Canada has never felt the need for such firewalls in its laws does not, by itself, undermine the argument for building such firewalls into the constitutions of countries such as the United
States with a history of recurrent and contagious financial crises. To date, presumably in the interest of efficiency and flexibility in financial markets and on the grounds that laws and regulations are enough, no country has, to my knowledge, built such firewalls into its constitution.
Recent literature on the economics of constitutions makes several useful points that are meant to illuminate the discussion to follow. Persson and Tabellini (2005) develop and test various hypotheses about economic outcomes -e.g., the size of the public sector -under different types of constitutions, contrasting presidential and parliamentary systems of government. Like Hirschl (2010) , Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) stress the economic origins of constitutions, following Beard (1913) who argued that the US constitution was designed to reflect the interests of the economic elite at the time, including those of the members of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, securing individual property rights as well as the best possible institutional framework for private enterprise. They compare 'majoritarian' constitutions (with, e.g., 'first-past-the-post' election systems rather than proportional representation) such as the constitutions of the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and also, to some extent, the US and 'consensual' constitutions characteristic of Northern Europe, showing how unequal societies tend to prefer 'majoritarian' constitutions. Acemoglu, Robinson, and Torvik (2011) analyze the pros and cons of constitutional checks and balances, pointing out, inter alia, that effective checks and balances are less likely to emerge when the political elite is well organized and able to influence or bribe politicians, especially in unequal societies. Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2012) discuss intertemporal aspects of constitution making, showing how the current rewards from adopting a specific constitution need to be viewed in the context of its likely implications for the future.
III. Constitutions differ, countries differ
Constitutions resemble exchange rate regimes in that, due to multiple objectives, one size does not fit all. Some countries abandon flexible exchange rates and adopt fixed rates or join currency unions looking for greater price stability. Other countries prefer floating rates to fixed ones in the pursuit of flexibility. This is why some countries fix their exchange rates while others allow them to float and others still go back and forth between fixed and floating rates. This is the way it should be. Different exchange rate regimes across countries reflect different assessments of the relative merits of flexibility and stability.
By the same token, constitutions differ because they aim to accommodate multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives. One such conflict concerns the establishment of clear and firm yet flexible rules. Constitutions need to be clear and firm to avoid legal ambiguity and they need to be flexible to stand the test of time. A constitution that will not bend will break (Posner, 2007) . Different constitutions reflect, in part, different assessments of the relative merits of clarity, firmness, and flexibility. Recent literature on rights protection in times of emergency illuminates one such conflict (Goderis and Versteeg, 2012) . Should countries always stick firmly to their commitments to human rights? Or should they be flexible? -that is, ready to sacrifice liberty for security. If, in times of emergency, majorities panic and fail to protect minority interests, there is a case to be made for sticking to prior commitments.
Against this view, Posner (2007) points out that a constitution is not a suicide pact and that governments may have to compromise rights today to save lives tomorrow.
Besides, constitutions may need to reflect local circumstances, customs, and history (Jacobsohn, 2010) . Against this point of view, other researchers claim that constitutions are, in fact, fairly standardized documents and rather similar across countries. Goderis and Versteeg (2011) show that constitutional provisions are often borrowed from other nations.
Both sides have a point. If history shows some nations -Denmark, say -to be fairly disciplined, they may need relatively few basic rules or restrictions to regulate their behavior.
If history suggests that some other nations -meet the Icelanders! -lack Danish discipline, they may for that reason need more detailed and less flexible laws and constitutions.
Discipline or lack thereof need not reflect national character, if such exists, but may be the result of other circumstances such as, for example, institutions and age; Iceland is a young republic (est. 1944). Since 1939, the Icelandic króna has lost 99.95 percent of its value vis-à-vis the Danish krone, for you to get my drift on discipline, political as well as pecuniary. This may be part of the reason why Denmark's constitution from which Iceland's constitution is derived seems to have served Denmark better than Iceland (the Danes last made a change to their constitution in 1953). If so, perhaps countries with a history of high inflation -Iceland and Turkey, for instance -need more comprehensive constitutions than low-inflation countries, a testable proposition in principle. Further, the assessment of the relative merits of the aims of constitutions may change over time. For example, some observers have suggested that the checks and balances built so carefully into the US constitution in 1787 may have contributed to recent gridlock in Washington.
Be that as it may, it seems clear that the absence of effective checks and balances in the provisional constitution of Iceland from 1944 made it possible for the undisciplined executive branch of government to assume too much power at the expense of both parliament and the courts. Three examples will suffice. First, virtually on their own, two cabinet ministers monopolize the appointment of all judges except for six years (1944-47, 1956-58, 1979-80, and 1987-88) . Those are the parties that privatized the two state banks 1998-2003 in a manner that paved the way for them to be run to the ground in record time as laid out in the SIC report and other public documents (more on this in Sections VI, VII, and XIX).
Those were not isolated occurrences. On the contrary, they were part of a broad pattern.
The supremacy of the executive branch over the legislative and judicial branches made Iceland's government in practice resemble a presidential system of government more than a semi-presidential or parliamentary one. This interpretation accords with the findings of Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) that, in democratic countries, (i) heavy dependence on natural resources tends to slow down long-run economic growth (the so-called 'resource curse') under a presidential system of government but not under a parliamentary system and (ii) the distinction between a parliamentary versus a presidential system matters more for the effects of natural resources on economic growth than the distinction between a democratic versus an autocratic form of government.
The unchecked supremacy of the executive branch made it easy for the Icelandic government first to allocate valuable common-property catch quotas to vessel owners from the mid-1980s onward and then, in like fashion, join hands -some would say jump into bedwith the bankers, first selling the state banks to their political cronies at modest prices, Russian style, and then making sure that the banks would not be bothered too much by reserve requirements or inquisitive financial supervision. In return, the banks treated the political parties and individual politicians generously as detailed in the nine-volume, 2,300-page report by the Special Investigation Committee appointed by the parliament (SIC, 2010, vol. 2, pp. 200-201, and vol. 8, pp. 164-170 , available only in Icelandic except for a brief executive summary that leaves out the financial relations between the banks and politicians, but see also Árnason, 2010) . When the banks crashed, ten out of 63 members of parliament owed the banks more than one million euro each at the pre-crash exchange rate of the króna; their personal debts to the failed banks ranged from €1 million to €40 million. The average debt of the ten MPs was €9 million. How many MPs owed the banks, say, half a million euro or more was not reported by the SIC nor is it known whether the loans of the failed banks to According to the 1944 constitution, the president's powers were mainly twofold. First, he or she had a catalyzing role to play in the formation of governments following parliamentary elections. Second, the president could refer laws adopted by parliament to a national referendum. The latter instrument lay dormant for 60 years, however, not being brought into use until 2004 when the parliament passed a law that would have broken up and effectively closed down the second largest television station and the second largest newspaper, concentrating control of the media in the hands of the government parties. The president exercised his constitutional veto right, but the referendum to be held on the law in accordance with the constitution did not take place. Rather, the parliament, without explicit authorization in the constitution, withdrew the legislation. This, in short, is how it came about that Iceland adopted Europe's first semi-presidential parliamentary government, that is, one where the president is directly elected by the people, and has significant powers de facto as well as de jure, and where the prime minister must enjoy the confidence of a popularly elected parliament (Duverger, 1980) . Today, Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and Romania all have semipresidential governments, even if some constitutions grant more power to the president than others.
The parliament promised at once to quickly revise the provisional constitution adopted in 
V. The process
In effect, the parliament admitted its 65-years-old failure to produce a new constitution by resolving to have a popularly elected constituent assembly do the job rather than the parliament itself. There were two good reasons for the adoption of this approach. One was clearly the parliament's long-standing failure to deliver. The other was that, among other things, the constitution is meant to circumscribe the powers of parliament and to lay out the method by which MPs are elected, tasks that would create a conflict of interest if undertaken by the parliament itself. The problem is at least as old as the US constitution, the oldest written constitution still in force. In the Federalist Papers, Madison (1788) wrote: "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions." Popper (1966, p. 128 ) put the question thus: "How can we organize political institutions so that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?" Goderis and Versteeg (2011) document the growing willingness of governments since World War II to constrain themselves by constitutional means, asking: "... Why would selfinterested elites willingly constrain themselves by constitutional means? Because they fear revolution, is one answer (Acemoglu & Robinson (2000) ; Elster (1995) ). Because they fear electoral competition is another (Ginsburg (2003) ; Hirschl (2004); Finkel (2004) ). Other accounts are more ideological and suggest that constitutionalism is spurred by the traumatic experience of war and dictatorship and a belief that unconstrained politics can be dangerous (Zakaria (2003); Weinrib (2007) ). What all these explanations have in common is that they focus on the domestic determinants of constitution-making. Whether through the electoral market or through changing beliefs, the constitution is perceived as a national product."
The Icelandic parliament decided in 2009 to proceed in three steps by (a) convening a National Assembly, (b) appointing a Constitutional Committee to gather information, provide analysis, and propose ideas, and (c) holding an election of Constitutional Assembly representatives. Thus, the parliament's aim was to have a people's constitution prepared rather than one written by the politicians themselves or their lawyers.
First, the National Assembly comprised about 1,000 individuals selected at random through stratified sampling from the national registry subject to certain constraints intended to secure equal representation of men and women of different ages as well as of different parts of the country. Held in October 2010, if only for a day, the National Assembly produced a brief document highlighting the things it wanted to see in a new constitution, including, for example, equal voting rights and public ownership of the country's natural resources. By law, the Constitutional Assembly was expected to consider the conclusions of the National Assembly.
The notion that the people should be involved in drafting their constitutions is gaining ground as the new 'gold standard' in constitutional design whereas, in the past, constitutions have been written mainly by alleged experts, sometimes even foreigners. For example, the post-apartheid South African constitutional assembly invited popular petitions and received many. The aim was, in part, to help build a sense of nationhood. It remains to be seen whether constitution-making processes with direct popular involvement actually produce different outcomes -constitutions that are more 'indigenous,' better tailored to local circumstances, or more effective. Ginsburg et al. (2009) Facebook. The electoral method used was STV (single-transferable-vote), a system designed to ensure that if your preferred candidate has no chance of being elected or has enough votes already, your vote is transferred to another candidate according to your instructions, thus ensuring that few votes go to waste (see Balinski and Laraki, 2010, p. 37) . The STV system is used, for example, in Ireland (except in elections for the presidency and by-elections) and Australia as well as in local elections in Scotland. Some observers attributed the 37 percent turnout in the Constitutional Assembly election to the STV system, claiming that choosing one to 25 candidates out of 523 was more off-putting than choosing one party slate out of, say, eight, the usual method. The media, including state television and radio, did little to inform the electorate about the issues or the candidates who seemed to view one another as fellow advocates of a common cause rather than as competitors or opponents. No opinion polls were conducted to gauge the support for individual candidates, so no one knew which among them were most likely to be elected.
The elected representatives comprised a diverse group of people of all ages with broad experience from almost every nook and cranny of national life: doctors, lawyers, priests, and professors, yes, but also company board members, a farmer, a champion for the rights of handicapped persons, mathematicians, media people, erstwhile members of parliament, a nurse, a philosopher, poets and artists, political scientists, a theatre director, and a labor union leader, a good cross section of society. Some expressed concern that too few of the elected representatives came from the countryside, partly because voter turnout there was somewhat lower than in the Reykjavík area. Others considered this immaterial on the grounds that where you happen to live matters less than a good understanding of the needs of the country as a whole.
VI. The Supreme Court's intervention
The aftermath of the election proved less civilized. One unsuccessful candidate and two other This is a key point: the Supreme Court invalidated the election without suggesting that the election results had been affected by the problems cited.
VII. Constitutional bill: Preliminaries
It was clear from the outset that the people wanted change.
In keeping with the conclusions of the National Assembly convened the month before, the answers the Constitutional Assembly candidates gave the media before the November 2010 election reflected a broad consensus that substantial changes in the constitution are needed.
Based on the answers given by 23 of the 25 candidates who were elected (two did not participate), 19 out of 23 said they were in favor of changing the constitution, 22 were in favor of equal voting rights everywhere in the country, 22 were in favor of public ownership of natural resources, 21 were in favor of more frequent national referenda, 20 favored strengthening the right of the public to information, 20 opposed the right of cabinet ministers to retain their seats in parliament, 18 were in favor of preserving the right of the president to refer laws to a national referendum, 18 were opposed to allowing ministers to appoint public officials on their own, and 16 were in favor of allowing voters to cast their vote for individual candidates and not just for party slates. Last but not least, all 23 were against allowing the minister of justice (now minister of the interior) to appoint judges on his or her own. To understand the 23 out of 23, it helps to know that throughout the history of the republic an overwhelming majority of judicial appointments has been made by ministers belonging to the two long-dominant political parties, the Independence Party and the Progressive Party.
According to opinion polls, public confidence in the courts has long been almost as low as public confidence in the parliament. The problem persists. In 2011, according to Market and Media Research, a leading pollster, only one respondent in three expressed great confidence in the judicial system compared with one in ten who expressed great trust in parliament. 1 In sum, the elected representatives wanted more democracy, more respect for human rights, more checks and balances, more transparency, and less corruption.
Opinion polls suggested that the broad consensus among the elected representatives as well as among the 523 candidates reflected not only the sentiments of the National Assembly attended by 1,000 randomly selected citizens, but reflected also public opinion. For example, the broad consensus among the representatives about the need to substantiate, or rather reclaim, the people's ownership rights to their natural resources accords with public opinion polls that have for many years consistently shown about 70 percent of the electorate to be opposed to the discriminatory nature of the fisheries management system that has turned a small group of boat owners into billionaires and major political power brokers. The National Assembly echoed this popular sentiment. The Constitutional Council considered itself obliged by law to take the resolutions of the National Assembly into consideration. Therefore, no one needed to be surprised when the Constitutional Council approved and delivered to parliament a constitutional bill that, if ratified in a national referendum, will entail a major overhaul of Iceland's constitution.
Early on in the Constitutional Council's work it became clear that most of its members wanted to start with a clean slate, to write a new constitution from scratch rather than revise the existing one. Even so, the council reached a consensus, approving the bill after four months of work with 25 votes against zero, a remarkable feat, not least in view of the fact that the reforms proposed are quite far-reaching and radical in a number of ways. The bill stresses stronger checks and balances between the three branches of government as well as between power and accountability. It stresses transparency, fairness, protection of the environment, and efficient and fair exploitation plus national ownership of the country's natural resources.
It aims to stamp out corruption and secrecy, yet leaves both words unspoken. At the same time, the bill promises continuity and stability by preserving and strengthening the semipresidential form of parliamentary government laid out in the provisional constitution from 1944. In effect, while retaining a popularly elected president with potentially significant powers, the bill aims to move the Icelandic governance model from 1944 in the direction of 'constrained parliamentarianism' along the lines of the constitutional practice of Canada, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Africa, and many other nations (Ackerman, 2000) .
A short preamble in first-person plural sets the tone:
"We, the people of Iceland, wish to create a just society with equal opportunities for everyone. Our different origins enrich the whole, and together we are responsible for the heritage of the generations, the land and history, nature, language and culture.
Iceland is a free and sovereign state, resting on the cornerstones of freedom, equality, democracy and human rights.
The government shall work for the welfare of the inhabitants of the country, strengthen their culture and respect the diversity of human life, the land and the biosphere.
We wish to promote peace, security, well-being and happiness among ourselves and future generations. We resolve to work with other nations in the interests of peace and respect for the Earth and all Mankind.
In this light we are adopting a new Constitution, the supreme law of the land, to be observed by all."
VIII. Some highlights and obstacles
Different Council representatives and different readers of the bill will no doubt produce different lists of their favorite provisions. Here I propose to present some of the highlights of the bill as I see it. I begin with the two articles that I find most important and that probably will engender the greatest resistance from the opponents of the bill. These two articles concern human rights in two dimensions, in the electoral system as well as in natural resource management. The emphasis on human rights in the bill reflects the evolution of international 
X. Natural resources
Article 34 is as follows: By "full consideration" is meant full market price -that is, the highest price that anyone is willing to pay, e.g., in a market, at auction, or in an agreement with the state as agent for the resource's rightful owner, the nation -for the right to exploit the resource in question. This marks a clear departure from current practice where vessel owners have been granted access to valuable common-property fishing quotas, first free of charge and then against nominal fees, a discriminatory and thereby also unconstitutional practice according to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights (2007). The Constitutional Council discussed the possibility of replacing "full consideration" by "fair consideration," but the idea was rejected on the grounds that "fair consideration" might be perceived as a constitutionally protected offer of a discount to those granted permits for the use or utilization of resources. Further, the wording "fair consideration" would have introduced an element of discrimination into the bill in violation of the equality clause (article 6) because the clause on the right of ownership (article 13) states: Like the constitution from 1944, the constitutional bill prescribes "full compensation" for private owners, and must treat all owners the same way.
The article on natural resources together with the articles on environmental protection is located in a chapter entitled "Human Rights and Nature." We do this to underline the human rights aspect of natural resource management.
Notice also the reference to "the common and perpetual property of the nation." Several constitutions (Chile, China, Ghana, Iraq, Kuwait, and Russia, to name a few) declare natural resources to be the property of the state. Some other constitutions are rather ambivalent or even silent on the subject of natural resources. For instance, the constitution of Nigeria lets it suffice to say that "the material resources of the nation are harnessed and distributed as best as possible to serve the common good."
The Iceland bill takes a different route based on an explicit conceptual distinction between the 'property of the nation' and 'property of the state.' State property -office buildings, for example -can be sold or pledged at will by the state. The property of the nation is different in that it "may never be sold or mortgaged." The wording "perpetual property of the nation" accords with the wording of the 1928 law about the national park at Thingvellir that states:
"The protected land shall be under the protection of parliament and the perpetual property of the nation. It may never be sold or mortgaged." This means that the present generation shares Thingvellir as well as the natural resources belonging to the nation with future generations, and does not have the right to dispose of the resources for its own benefit. These restrictions are meant to refer to the natural resources themselves as well as to the rights attached to the resources.
In part to clarify the meaning of the nation's, as opposed to the state's, ownership rights to its natural resources, the article on natural resources is preceded by a corresponding article on cultural assets (article 32):
Valuable national possessions pertaining to the Icelandic cultural heritage, such as national relics and ancient manuscripts, may neither be destroyed nor surrendered for permanent possession or use, sold or pledged.
National ownership of cultural assets as well as of (renewable) natural resources is intended to impose on the current generation a duty to preserve the assets in question for unborn generations. State ownership involves no such duty.
XI. Iceland's nature and environment
Article 33 is as follows: These articles stipulate 'new' rights present in many modern constitutions but hardly in any constitution written before the 1980s. Other novelties include the bill's provisions about the right to information, freedom of the media, the appointment of public officials, independent state agencies, and national referenda to which we now turn.
Iceland's nature is the foundation of life in the country. Everyone is under obligation to respect it and protect it. Everyone shall by law be ensured the right to a healthy environment, fresh water, clean air and unspoiled nature. This means maintenance of life and land and protection of sites of natural interest, unpopulated wilderness, vegetation and soil. Previous damage shall be repaired to the extent possible. The use of natural resources shall be managed so as to minimize their depletion in the long

XII. Right to information and freedom of the media
Article 15 The constitutional protection accorded to journalists does not apply to the information they have gathered, but only to the sources of the information. This is a key distinction underlying the constitutional protection of sources and whistle-blowers. Freedom of the media is an important pillar of democracy and, therefore, merits constitutional protection.
The two articles on the right to information and freedom of the media aim to increase transparency and help uproot a pervasive official culture of secrecy and submissive journalism. In Iceland, until recently, even the travel expenses of cabinet ministers and other public officials were not accessible to journalists or the general public. The problem persists.
In the course of its work, one of the committees of Constitutional Council was denied access to information about pension payments from the Pension Fund of Public Employees to those retirees receiving the highest payments. The request for this information was predicated on the common knowledge that some politicians and public officials receive multiple pensions, but names with amounts attached are kept from public view, a state of affairs that the constitutional bill aims to change.
XIII. Appointment of public officials
Article 96 is as follows: The reference up front to "qualifications and objective viewpoints" as well as the establishment of a civil service commission is intended to put an end to ministerial appointments of incompetent or acquiescent people to high office. The ban in the equality provision (article 6) against discrimination with regard to 'political affiliation,' among other things, serves a similar purpose. Appointment corruption is a serious problem in Iceland as can be inferred, for example, from the criticism of several aspects of public administration presented in the SIC report of 2010 as well as from opinions issued by the parliament's ombudsman. Rather than have the minister of the interior appoint judges and the state prosecutor on his or her own, the bill stipulates that either the president or a two-thirds majority in parliament must confirm the appointment. Likewise, rather than have ministers appoint other senior officials (e.g., cabinet secretaries and directors of key state agencies) on their own, the bill stipulates that such appointments must either follow the recommendations of an independent committee set up by the civil service commission whose chairman is appointed by the president or they must be confirmed by a two-thirds majority in parliament.
Qualifications and objective viewpoints shall decide appointments to offices. When a Cabinet Minister makes an appointment to the posts of judge and Director of Public
The new, supervisory role conferred on the president plus the overlapping authority of ministers and parliament aim to disperse the power to make civil service appointments in an attempt to increase competence in public administration.
XIV. Independent state agencies
Article 97 is as follows:
Certain agencies of the State which carry out important regulatory functions or gather information which is necessary in a democratic society may be granted special independence by law. The activities of such agencies cannot be discontinued, significantly changed or entrusted to other agencies except by an act of law passed by a two-thirds majority in the Althing.
This article is intended to safeguard the activities and independence of state agencies that need to be able to operate independently without undue political interference, especially agencies with important supervisory functions and information gathering responsibilities as necessary in a democratic society. In Council debates, some of the main agencies mentioned in this context were the Central Bank, the Financial Supervisory Authority, the Competition Authority, and Statistics Iceland in addition to the National Audit Office and the Ombudsman of the Althing that already enjoy constitutional protection. The article also aims to cover similar agencies charged with supervision and data collection concerning the environment. To be able to perform their duties, supervisory agencies need to be independent. Financial supervisory agencies, for example, need to be able to inspect bank operations without government interference or threats that parliament by a simple majority can dismantle them or disrupt their operations. The same applies to agencies charged with securing free and fair competition as well as to agencies gathering economic data or providing economic advice to the government and the public. The guiding principle behind this article is independence with accountability. Independent monetary policy must be guarded against the vicissitudes of political life. A central bank lacking independence will find it difficult to provide impartial economic counsel. The same applies to other institutions dispensing economic policy advice.
Such institutions must stand ready to issue warnings about pending dangers on the economic front and to present inconvenient economic data and advice. This is why the bill stipulates that state agencies that have been placed in this category by law can only be dismantled by a two-thirds majority in parliament. Increased independence of state agencies needs to go hand in hand with external accountability as well as internal checks and balances.
The article on independent state agencies did not emerge from thin air. In 2002, the government decided to summarily abolish the National Economic Institute (est. 1974) on the grounds, among other things, that the economic analysis on offer from the commercial banks was enough. Subsequently, Statistics Iceland looked the other way while the distribution of disposable -that is, after-tax -income as measured by the Gini index became progressively less equal year after year due mostly to the government's deliberate shift of the tax burden from the most affluent groups in society to low-to-middle-income families. The government did this by tempting the rich to reclassify their labor incomes as capital incomes, taxed at ten percent, while essentially freezing the level of tax-free income with the result that inflation, through tax creep, made more and more low-income earners have to pay taxes. The ensuing increase in inequality brought Iceland's income distribution from approximate parity with the Nordic countries in the mid-1990s to near parity with the United States in 2007, a dramatic change denied by the government at the time (Gylfason et al., . Before the onset of the crisis, increased disparity of income and wealth was one of several signs that Iceland was headed for trouble. Increased inequality also preceded the Great Depression in the United
States 1929-39 (Galbraith, 1988, pp. 177-8) .
XV. National referenda and role of the president
The bill seeks to preserve and strengthen one of the hallmarks of the 1944 constitution, namely, the semi-presidential model of parliamentary democracy, in two main ways.
First, the constitutional right to refer to a national referendum laws passed by parliament remains unchanged in the hands of the president, and is, secondly, granted also to ten percent of the electorate. This means that even in cases where the president sees no reason to refer a piece of legislation to a referendum, valid signatures by ten percent of the electorate can nonetheless do so. Experience from other countries seems to suggest that higher thresholds such as 15 percent are difficult to surpass (Direct Democracy, 2008, p. 198) . Hence, with a threshold of ten percent, national referenda are intended to be more commonly used than The issues deemed unfit for referenda requested by ten percent of the electorate -the government budget, etc. -do not extend to the president's right to refer laws to a referendum.
The president's right in this regard remains undiminished from current practice.
The guiding principle behind these three articles is the dispersion of power in order to bolster direct democracy through increased use of national referenda to absolve the parliament of particularly difficult and divisive decisions such as about EU membership or a new constitution. This article thus aims to encourage the outsourcing, or, better put, return, of some of the parliament's decision making to the people on the understanding that democracy means, in the words of Lord George-Brown, Britain's foreign secretary in the 1960s, in a public lecture in Reykjavík in 1971, that "There shall be no one to stop us from being stupid if stupid we want to be."
XVI. Anomalies
The constitution from 1944 contains several anomalies that remain in force because of the parliament's inability to keep its 65-years-old promise to revise the constitution. Two quick examples will suffice to suggest the extent of the problem. 
XVII. Absent: Financial and fiscal issues
We now return to something completely different, a topic introduced in Section II. Does financial regulation belong in constitutions? Or is it enough to confine such regulation to laws? -which, to date, is near-universal practice.
This is a fair question, especially in a country that has recently gone through one of the worst financial crashes on record, with grave consequences for many households and firms at farther. Likewise, politicians usually go as far as they can in the pursuit of their objectives by making laws and executing them subject to the restraints imposed by the constitution, and sometimes also by public opinion. This is why it is common practice around the world to put in the constitution general provisions laying out the division of responsibility and power among the three main branches of government, checks and balances, and to delegate to the law specific provisions concerning day-to-day government, including its regulation of banks and other financial institutions. The constitutional bill for Iceland is in this spirit. The bill aims to sharpen the division of power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government to contain the ability of the authorities to harm the rights and interests of the public. The articles concerning the right to information, freedom of the media, appointments to public office, the independence of key state agencies, and parliamentary investigation committees are, inter alia, intended to reduce the likelihood that the banks can again outgrow the government's ability to protect the people against the banks. Do these provisions suffice to prevent another crash? No. Probably no constitution can offer such a guarantee. All that a constitution can be expected to do -or the law, for that matter -is to lower the probability of yet another crash.
Would it have been better to include in the bill an article aimed at tying the hands of the banks? This could have been done by, for example, stipulating quantitative limits on the ratio of foreign debt to gross domestic product or on the ratio of the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank to some appropriate base such as the short-term foreign liabilities of the banking system. The latter ratio, by the Giudotti-Greenspan rule, must never be allowed to fall below unity lest the currency be exposed to heads-I-win-tails-you-lose speculative attacks, a well-known proposition since the outbreak of the Southeast Asian financial crisis in 1997.
Some countries have written such quantitative requirements into law. A rare exception, Bhutan's recent constitution features an article on the management of foreign exchange reserves as follows: "A minimum foreign currency reserve that is adequate to meet the cost of not less than one year's import must be maintained."
In US law, 'prompt corrective action' mandates progressive penalties against banks that exhibit progressively deteriorating capital ratios (see Goodhart 2009) . In this vein, would an article protecting and extending 'prompt corrective action' by enabling the authorities to take over banks before their legal insolvency, thus infringing on property rights to safeguard society, have belonged in the Iceland bill? In the end, it was decided to let it suffice to extend the article on the right of ownership currently in force by adding the words "Ownership rights entail obligations as well as restrictions in accordance with law" without granting the state explicit constitutionally protected authority to take over troubled banks.
Quantitative economic provisions are uncommon in constitutions for three main reasons.
First, the desire for durability through flexibility is inclined against constitutional clauses involving economic variables. Second, such rules are easy to circumvent by adjusting statistical definitions. This, by the way, is also why the Iceland bill does not contain provisions specifying limits on the government budget deficit or on public debt. Germany, badly burnt by hyperinflation in the interwar period, was until recently the only European country with such a provision in its constitution from 1949. The Hungarian constitution of 2012 stipulates that "Parliament may not adopt a State Budget Act which allows state debt to exceed half of the Gross Domestic Product." However, it goes on to add that "Any deviation ... shall only be possible during a special legal order, to the extent required for mitigating the consequences of the causes, and if there is a significant and enduring national economic recession, to the extent required for redressing the balance of the national economy." Third, quantitative constitutional provisions, or even only legal ones, related to, for example, gross domestic product (GDP) would need to be accompanied by special rules concerning adjustment to a contraction of GDP, tempting the government to keep GDP in money terms artificially high and thus imparting an inflationary bias to the economic system.
Had it been better to include such a provision on fiscal affairs in the Icelandic bill? The idea was discussed at length in the Council, but it was rejected. Again, consider aviation.
Locking the steering wheel can be a good idea under good flying conditions. In extreme weather or other emergencies, however, every pilot wants to be able to overrule the aircraft's computer. The human mind must always have the last word. This fundamental principle applies to constitutional economics no less than to aviation. Besides, it is easy to bypass such Organization of the Independence Party whose leader declared from the outset that his party would pay no attention to the work of the Constitutional Council. In a nutshell, the apparently predetermined attitude among many lawyers to the bill seems to be attributable to the historically close connection of the department of law of the University of Iceland and large swaths of the legal profession to the Independence Party, to the lucrative services that academic lawyers have rendered as advisors to governments led by or including the Independence Party, and to the apparent sentiment among many lawyers that constitution making is their prerogative, and theirs alone. Many lawyers, like many politicians, seem to view the Constitutional Council as an intruder on their turf. They were against -even boycotted, some would say -the election to the National Assembly because they did not seem to accept the third pillar of the social rule of law, that is, the idea that the people, the nation, are the sole source of the parliament's legislative authority. The invalidation of the National Assembly election by the Supreme Court needs to be viewed in this light (recall Section VI).
XIX. From insourcing to crowdsourcing
Let me now turn from the substance of the Icelandic constitutional bill to the method that was used to produce it (this section draws on Gylfason, 2011c) .
Iceland has never been particularly good at outsourcing. Insourcing, on the other handself-dealing, that is -has been something of a national sport. For example, a few years ago first the nephew and then a close friend (you met him in Section VI) of the prime minister were appointed judges on the Supreme Court. When a few years later the prime minister's son was appointed district judge, a more qualified applicant for the job sued the offending minister and was awarded financial compensation by the Supreme Court (much lower compensation, however, than a lower court had decided). (Both cabinet ministers mentioned in the preceding sentence were among the seven politicians and public officials referred to in Section VI). After the crash of 2008, to take another example, the government thought it better to appoint a domestic Special Investigation Committee, rejecting proposals for an international commission of enquiry that would have been beyond all suspicion of partiality.
As it happened, the SIC did a good job, but that is another story (Gylfason, 2010) .
The Constitutional Council decided to do things differently. The Council decided to invite the people of Iceland to participate in the drafting of the constitutional bill on the internet, an arrangement that has attracted considerable interest in foreign media (see, e.g., The Guardian, 9 June 2011). This decision proved advantageous and trouble-free. It was known that ordinary people from all walks of life were interested in seeing the constitution revised, and were even passionate about it. Otherwise, 523 people would hardly have run for the 25 seats in the Constitutional Assembly. Surprisingly, perhaps, constitutions and constitution making seem to appeal to many people without any particular interest in legislative work or politics. Even more striking, to me, was the lack of enthusiasm of several academics, not only lawyers, with well regarded expertise when asked to contribute to the work of the Council.
The job was done in three overlapping rounds. First, each week, the Constitutional Council posted on its website some new provisional articles for perusal by the public. In a second round, usually two to three weeks later, after receiving comments and suggestions from the public as well as from experts, the Council posted revised versions of those articles on the website. Then, in a final round, proposals for changes in the document as a whole were debated and voted upon article by article, and the final version of the bill was prepared. At the end of the last round, each article was approved by an overwhelming majority of votes. The passage of the articles on the parliamentary election system and on natural resources (recall Sections IX and X) was followed by spontaneous applause.
Judging 
XX. Lessons from, and for, other countries
It is too early to draw general lessons from the ongoing Icelandic experiment in constitution making because we do not yet know how the story will end. We do not yet know, after eight months of discussion in the Constitutional and Supervisory Committee (CSC) of the parliament, whether the government will manage to keep its promise to hold an advisory referendum on the bill to coincide with the presidential election in mid-2012, the current plan approved in late February 2012 by 31 votes to 15 in parliament with 17 abstentions, or whether it will be able to hold onto its slender majority in parliament long enough to stick to its guns. We do not know whether the opponents of the bill will try to derail the referendum through filibuster. Further, while the parliament decided on short notice to reconvene the Constitutional Council in early March 2012 to respond to questions and suggestions proposed by the CSC, we do not know whether the parliament will change the bill -and, if so, howbefore putting it to a referendum if a referendum is to be held. The outcome remains uncertain because the post-crash government that launched the project is weak and, apart from the prime minister, Ms. Jóhanna Sigurdardóttir, as well as a few other MPs, appears strangely unenthusiastic about its own offspring. There is also significant opposition to the bill from those who do not like to see their privileges reduced as is necessary in the interests of equal opportunity and human rights. The opponents, strongly opposed to equal voting rights and to national ownership rights to natural resources, among other things, happen to be the ones who, contrary to the clear evidence presented in the SIC report as well as to the parliament's unanimous resolution of September 2010 accepting the main findings of the report, most vehemently deny any responsibility for the 2008 crash. In fact, on delivering its report in 2010, the SIC stated how struck it had been by the unwillingness of everyone interviewed by the committee to admit any blame for what went wrong. Collective admission of responsibility was all right for them, however, for if everyone is responsible, no one is.
Herein lies a serious challenge. Even in East and Central Europe that saw about 25 new constitutions come into being after 1990, the communists -clearly responsible for the collapse of their countries, and mostly admitting as much themselves, even to the point of apologizing for their mismanagement, or worse -contributed to the constitution-making efforts by their fellow citizens rather than try to sabotage them. Their successors wanted to include the communists in the process and, in most places, they accepted. A similar readiness to cooperate has not been forthcoming from the two political parties that governed Iceland from 1995 to 2007, privatizing the banks à la russe and thus laying the ground for their demise a few short years later. Instead, they declared from the outset that they wanted no part in the project, thereby turning their backs on the official position of earlier leaders of their parties who repeatedly promised revising the constitution, and failed to do so time and again.
Understandably, with this lack of cooperation from two of the five political parties represented in parliament, the rest of us cannot be expected to grant them a right of veto.
Instead, we have to say to them: Everyone was free to run for the Constitutional Assembly, you had the same opportunities as everyone else to offer your services every step of the way, and now the bill is ready, having been approved unanimously by the Constitutional Council, so there is only one more thing we have to do to finish the work and that is to allow the people to decide in a national referendum where every vote carries equal weight. The opponents need to remember how the American constitution was approved in 1787-88: by 89 to 79 votes in Virginia, 30 to 27 in New York, 187 to 168 in Massachusetts, and so on (Maier, 2010) . In
Rhode Island, the only state to hold a popular referendum, it was rejected. But the rules of the game stipulated that approval by a simple majority of elected representatives in at least nine states out of 13 would suffice, and that was to be. Faced with such a prospect, the Icelandic opposition may try to find a way to derail the promised referendum rather than risk losing it.
If the people were to be denied the right to vote on the bill and the bill were to be shelved, against the odds, would they take to the streets, banging their pots and pans? They know how to. They have done it before. This is, indeed, an unusual situation for a Nordic country to be in.
Or is it? The recent history of the Faroe Islands, a self-governing dependency of Denmark since 1948, may be illustrative. After ten years of preparation, a left-of-center coalition government readied the Faroe Islands' first constitutional bill, dated 2009, for a national referendum scheduled to take place in 2010. The government failed to finish its term and to deliver the bill to the promised referendum. A complicating factor was the Danish government's protestation that the bill is tantamount to a declaration of independence and thus is inconsistent with the Faroe Islands' status as a dependency of Denmark, a thorny issue that has bitterly divided the islanders since before 1948. A right-of-center government came to office following parliamentary elections in 2011, and shows no signs of intending to hold a referendum on the bill. Again, we do not know how the story will end. We do know, however, that there are strong private interests of boat owners and allied politicians in the new government aligned against the article on natural resources in the Faroese bill. Fully consistent with human rights, the article states that (a) the authorities are responsible for managing the country's natural resources (meaning fish), (b) the nation owns the resources and charges for their utilization or grants everyone equal access to them, and (c) the exploitation of the resources and the environment must be sustainable.
The full story is more nuanced. In fact, the Faroese constitutional bill can be traced to an economic crash in 1989-94 when GDP contracted by a third like in the Soviet Union around the same time, the deepest country-wide economic slump on record in democratic Europe in peace time. After a few difficult years of crisis and its aftermath, including controversial Danish involvement in the restitution of the collapsed economy and political structure, a coalition of three separatist parties -i.e., parties in favor of full independence from Denmark -took in 1998 the initiative to prepare a constitution. Apart from representatives from all political parties, the government appointed a number of specialists in law, social sciences, and history to the committee. With the political parties involved, however, astute observers felt that there never was any realistic chance of sailing the ship to harbor, partly because the same politicians that were responsible for the economic crisis of 1989-94 were heavily represented and partly because the divide between separatist and unionist parties was likely to block any agreement on the question of Faroese sovereignty. After a few false starts, the committee presented in 2006 a proposal for a new constitution to the government, its employer. Since then, the bill has been the subject of endless debates in parliament. Unlike its Icelandic counterpart, the Faroese project was not embedded in the people, but in the political structure.
As in Iceland from 1944 to 2009, this setup was doomed. But, it is one thing for the Faroese parliament to kill a constitution bill drafted by a parliamentary committee as now seems possible or even likely and quite another for the Icelandic parliament to turn its back on a bill composed by a popularly elected and then appointed constituent assembly by denying the people the right to decide for themselves whether to accept the bill or reject it.
Even if the opponents manage somehow to kill the bill in Iceland, the bill is there, featuring, it is hoped, some ideas and formulations that may be worth considering for adoption in other countries. Moreover, the method by which the bill was produced may offer a model to other countries preparing new constitutions -for example, Egypt, Tunisia, and The main lesson from Iceland's crowdsourcing experiment, however, may be universal:
Treat people with respect and they will respond in kind. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
